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The Minimum Wage and the Great Recession:




Clemens and Wither (2014) find that minimum wage increases contributed to employ-
ment declines among low-skilled individuals during the Great Recession. Zipperer
(2016) argues that Clemens and Wither’s estimates are biased. This paper assesses what
underlies the difference between Zipperer’s estimates and Clemens and Wither’s esti-
mates. I first show that Zipperer’s control sets significantly attenuate the relationship
between Clemens and Wither’s “treatment indicator” variables and states’ minimum
wage rates. Scaling for this dilution of the underlying treatment accounts for nearly half
of the difference between Zipperer’s estimates and Clemens and Wither’s estimates. Sec-
ond, I show that the within-region variation on which Zipperer focuses attention biases
his estimates towards positive values. Employment and income aggregates, as well as
housing and construction indicators, reveal that within-region comparisons are prone to
considerable upward bias. Florida, for example, experienced a far more severe housing
decline than the regional neighbors for which several of Zipperer’s specifications use it
as the primary control. I show that Zipperer’s estimates are quite sensitive to remov-
ing states with extreme housing crises from the sample, while the original Clemens and
Wither estimates are not. I further show that Zipperer’s specifications have implausi-
ble implications for the minimum wage’s “effects” on employment within high skilled
population groups. I conclude by recapitulating the basic facts underlying Clemens and
Wither’s assessment of the evidence.
∗Clemens: University of California at San Diego, Jeffrey Clemens, Economics Department, 9500 Gilman
Drive #0508, La Jolla, CA 92093-0508, USA. Telephone: 1-509-570-2690. E-mail: clemens.jeffrey@gmail.com.
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Employment among low-skilled individuals declined dramatically during the Great
Recession. Clemens and Wither (2014) and Clemens (2015) investigate whether the fed-
eral minimum wage, which concurrently rose from $5.15 to $7.25, contributed to these
declines. Using standard program evaluation techniques, these papers estimate that min-
imum wage increases explain a non-trivial share of the decline in low-skilled groups’
employment. A September 2016 revision of Clemens and Wither (2014) consolidates
these empirical analyses.1 Zipperer (2016) critiques selected portions of this September
2016 revision.2 The current paper assesses Zipperer’s comment.
Zipperer’s comment is of interest in part because it is representative of the critiques
Allegretto, Dube, Reich, and Zipperer (2017) have recently raised against work by Neu-
mark and Wascher (2006), Neumark, Salas, and Wascher (2014b), and Meer and West
(2016). The debate involving these authors can be difficult to evaluate, due in part to
the nature of the policy variation underlying estimates of the minimum wage’s effects.
The papers at issue analyze a multi-decade panel that contains more than 200 state and
federal minimum wage changes.3 As shown by Sorkin (2015), the available variation
is primarily suitable for estimating short-run responses to temporary minimum wage
increases.4
1The September 2016 revision can be found here: http://econweb.ucsd.edu/˜j1clemens/
pdfs/ClemensWitherMinimumWageGreatRecession.pdf.
2The December 2016 version of Zipperer’s analysis was available at the following link as of
March 2017: http://cdn.equitablegrowth.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/02155549/
120616-WP-comments-on-clemens-and-wither.pdf. The comprehensiveness of the current pa-
per’s response is related in part to the appearance of a variant on Zipperer’s empirical analysis in an
anonymous review of the original Clemens and Wither analysis. Zipperer and co-authors have referenced
his analysis as evidence against the analysis in Clemens and Wither (2014) since as early as a July 2016
revision of Allegretto, Dube, Reich, and Zipperer (2017).
3Unsurprisingly given this environment, the analyses have little to say about policy implementation
lags. Consequently, they struggle to compellingly distinguish between worrisome “pre-existing trends”
and causal anticipation effects. Similarly, they do not distinguish between one time minimum wage
changes, multi-phase minimum wage changes, and the increasingly prominent minimum wage changes
linked to inflation-indexing provisions (Strain and Brummund, 2016).
4Because most historical minimum wage changes were legislated in nominal terms, they have been
temporarily binding due to both inflation and real productivity growth.
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One benefit of the current setting is that the research designs implemented by Clemens
and Wither (2014) are relatively straightforward.5 This is facilitated by the fact that the
analysis involves a single piece of federal minimum wage legislation that more strongly
bound the minimum wage rates in one half of the country than in the other. As they
pertain to this particular historical episode, one can assess the assumptions underlying
alternative empirical specifications with more clarity than is possible in analyses of the
multi-decade panel.
As summarized in Zipperer’s abstract, he finds that the difference-in-differences esti-
mators in the September 2016 revision of Clemens and Wither (2014) are sensitive to the
inclusion of “sectoral or geographic controls.” To be more specific, these controls include
sets of census region-by-time effects, sets of census division-by-time effects, and interac-
tions between time effects and variables that describe states’ industrial composition at
baseline. The minimum wage literature’s debate over these “sectoral” and “geographic”
controls involves two recurring areas of contention, both of which involve a combination
of setting-specific issues and issues that are broadly applicable. I show that both recur-
ring areas of contention are relevant to understanding the differences between Zipperer’s
estimates and the baseline estimates of Clemens and Wither (2014).
The first recurring area of contention involves the question of how dramatically the
“sectoral” and “geographic” control variables reduce the policy variation utilized for
econometric identification. In the current setting, a salient dimension of this issue can
be assessed by estimating the effects of Zipperer’s control sets on the underlying “first
stage” relationship between Clemens and Wither’s policy indicator variables and states’
effective minimum wage rates. That is, to what extent do these control sets dilute the
treatment underlying estimated changes in employment? The estimates in tables 1 and 2
5This is evidenced in part by the fact that Zipperer’s (2016) replication of Clemens and Wither’s CPS
analysis is perfect and that his replication of the prior paper’s SIPP analysis is near perfect.
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show that Zipperer’s specifications substantially reduce the implicit first stage point esti-
mate underlying the Current Population Survey (CPS) analysis in Clemens and Wither’s
(2014) revision. The estimates in table 3 show that Zipperer’s specifications more mod-
erately reduce the first stage implicitly underlying Clemens and Wither’s (2014) analysis
of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).
Accounting for attenuation of the implicit “first stage” is essential for converting
estimates into comparable changes in employment per dollar increase in the minimum
wage. On average across estimates using the SIPP, re-scaling for attenuation accounts
for just under half of the difference between the baseline and Zipperer’s estimates. On
average across estimates using the CPS, attenuation accounts for just over half of the
difference.6
A second key question is whether Zipperer’s control sets exacerbate bias despite in
principle being intended to reduce it. While within-region comparisons may have an
intuitive appeal, standard applied econometric insights emphasize that “within” estima-
tors can be more, less, or just as biased as “within and across” estimators. As Neumark
and Wascher (2017) observe, these insights can be traced at least as far back as work by
Griliches (1977, 1979) on the economic returns to education.
In the current setting, a cursory knowledge of the geography of the housing crisis
reveals within-region variation to be problematic. In the South, for example, the majority
of the individuals in the “control” group come from Florida. In the Mountain West, the
majority come from Arizona. Many readers will recognize Florida and Arizona to be
states that experienced relatively extreme housing crises, in particular when compared
6One way to place the first stage’s relevance into perspective is to average its effects in terms of per-
centage point changes in the point estimate rather than in terms of the percent of the difference explained.
On average across all specifications, Zipperer’s point estimates are 2.7 percentage points higher than their
respective Clemens and Wither estimates. Similarly averaged across specifications, attenuation of the first
stage point estimate accounts for a 1.3 percentage point difference. Expressed in this way, attenuation of
the first stage point estimate accounts for just under half of the difference between Zipperer’s estimates
and Clemens and Wither’s estimates.
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with their regional neighbors. Indeed, they are states that fail to meet even the most
lenient of the matching criteria considered in Clemens (2015). This suggests that weight
ought to be shifted away from comparisons involving these states rather than towards
them.
Section 3 develops this point by providing a detailed descriptive look at variations
in the severity of the housing crisis both across and within regions. Tables 4, 5, and
6 compare changes in aggregate income, employment, and housing market indicators
across the treatment and control groups. Control states experienced more severe reces-
sions than treatment states along each of these dimensions. Consequently, estimates that
make no effort to control for variations in the recession’s severity across states will be
biased towards positive values. Note that Zipperer’s conclusions require believing the
opposite to be the case.
A key question for assessing Zipperer’s specifications is whether within-region vari-
ations are more or less exposed to biases due to the severity of the underlying recession
than variations that extend both across and within regions. Table 6 reveals that within-
region comparisons exacerbate the degree of imbalance between the treatment and con-
trol groups. The basic premise underlying a preference for within-region comparisons
thus does not hold in this setting.
How empirically relevant are the biases associated with restricting attention to within-
region comparisons? A straightforward way to provide evidence on this point is to esti-
mate Zipperer’s specifications, along with the Clemens and Wither baseline, on samples
that exclude Arizona and Florida. I report these results in tables 7 through 9. The re-
sults show that Arizona and Florida significantly shape Zipperer’s analysis. On average
across specifications in both the SIPP and CPS, comparable estimates are just over one
percentage point more negative than the estimates Zipperer reports. Across Zipperer’s
specifications, the estimated declines in employment per dollar increase in the minimum
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wage are, on this sample, economically indistinguishable from the Clemens and Wither
baseline. That is, the weight Zipperer’s specifications place on Florida and Arizona,
coupled with his specifications’ attenuation of the implicit first stage, explain nearly the
entirety of the difference between Zipperer’s estimates and the estimates from Clemens
and Wither’s (2014) revision.7
I push further to provide relatively systematic evidence on the bias Zipperer’s con-
trol sets introduce. First, I supplement the ad hoc exclusion of Arizona and Florida with
the matching exercises that were developed for Clemens and Wither’s (2014) revision.
That is, I estimate Zipperer’s specifications on samples restricted to states that can be
matched on the basis of the magnitudes of their housing declines. This analysis thus
uses a procedure developed prior to Zipperer’s comment to investigate whether his esti-
mates are driven by states that are outside of the common support of the housing decline
distribution. The results are presented in tables 10 through 12. On average across the
30 relevant regressions (5 specifications across 3 analysis samples and 2 matching crite-
ria), the estimates are 1.5 percentage points more negative than the estimates Zipperer
reports. Coupled with the appropriate scaling for his specifications’ attenuation of the
implicit first stage, the differences between his estimates and those in the revision of
Clemens and Wither (2014) are fully explained.
In additional analysis, I investigate whether Zipperer’s specifications predict varia-
tions in employment among skill groups for which the minimum wage has no direct
effect. I show that they do. In the SIPP analysis, Zipperer’s specifications suggest that a
$0.40 increase in the minimum wage generated an 0.8 percentage point increase in em-
7On average across the 15 relevant regressions (5 alternative control sets across 3 analysis samples), the
difference between Zipperer’s βPost 2(t) estimate and the Clemens and Wither baseline is 2.7 percentage
points. On average, re-scaling for the first stage accounts for a 1.3 percentage point difference. The re-
scaling of the first stage and the percentage point difference associated with the weight Zipperer places
on Florida and Arizona thus account for nearly 90 percent of the difference between Zipperer’s estimates
and the baseline estimates from Clemens and Wither’s (2014) revision.
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ployment among individuals with average baseline wages in excess of $10.8 Zipperer’s
CPS specifications have the implication that a $0.30 increase in the minimum wage in-
creased employment across the upper 90 percent of the skill distribution by a full per-
centage point.9 If taken at face value, these estimates suggest that an additional $2 or
$3 increase in the minimum wage would have prevented employment from declining by
even a single percentage point during the Great Recession.
At this point it is relevant to discuss the portions of Clemens and Wither’s (2014) anal-
ysis that are omitted from Zipperer’s discussion. These include both the aforementioned
matching research design and a triple-difference estimator. The triple-difference estima-
tor is of most immediate interest. Algebraically, the triple-difference estimator’s state-
by-time effects subsume Zipperer’s sets of state-by-time varying controls. Indeed, this
specification was developed with the debate over geographic controls in mind. That is, it
is a specification that is able to rule out some forms of the “geographic controls critique”
without simultaneously altering the cross-state comparisons that underlie econometric
identification. As Clemens and Strain (2017) clarify, “The inclusion of state-by-time-
period effects enables the [triple-difference] specification to control flexibly for economic
factors that vary across states and over time. They control for such factors as they man-
ifest themselves through employment changes among the individuals included in the
sample as ‘within-state control groups.”’ Because Zipperer leaves readers uninformed
of this analysis, he offers a misleadingly broad impression of the forms his critique can
plausibly take. Further, the analysis summarized above reveals that Zipperer’s estimates
are quite sensitive to both the matching and triple-difference approaches.
Zipperer presents a separate exercise that he describes as “an important falsification
8$0.40 is the differential change in the minimum wage associated with the implicit first stage for the
relevant specifications.
9$0.30 is the differential change in the minimum wage associated with the implicit first stage for the
relevant specifications.
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test.” The variation at work in this exercise is quite similar to the within-region vari-
ation discussed above. The key detail is that roughly four-fifths of the observations to
which Zipperer assigns “placebo treatment status” come from Florida and Arizona. As
shown in additional analysis in Clemens (2017), the falsification test is thus biased for
the same reason Zipperer’s full-sample specifications are biased. That is, the procedure
generates negative estimates because it assigns “placebo treatment status” to states that
experienced extreme housing crises. Clemens (2017) further shows that test-appropriate
confidence intervals are far wider than those Zipperer reports.10 The “falsification test”
is thus uninformative for its intended purpose.
After presenting the analysis discussed above, I conclude by returning to several key
facts related to the labor market developments under analysis. First, I briefly recapitulate
the basic findings of Clemens and Wither (2014) and Clemens (2015). I then connect
the regression estimates to unadjusted data. The facts underlying Clemens and Wither’s
reading of the evidence can be summarized as follows: in comparisons between “bound”
and “unbound” states, employment among low-skilled individuals in “bound” states
declined much more than one would predict based on changes their in macroeconomic
conditions. Finally, insights from the conceptual framework in Clemens and Wither’s
(2014) revision are easily overlooked in the debate over program evaluation methods. I
thus conclude by summarizing these insights.
1 Background on the Empirical Setting
This section proceeds as follows. Sub-section 1.1 overviews the minimum wage
changes under analysis. Sub-section 1.2 overviews the basic difference-in-differences
10The basic issue is that the properties of clustered robust standard errors do not carry over from the
baseline regression, in which “treatment” is assigned to 27 of 50 states, to the falsification tests, in which
“placebo treatment” is assigned to either 3 or 5 of 23 states.
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design deployed in Clemens and Wither’s (2014) revision using both the Current Popu-
lation Survey (CPS) and the 2008 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participa-
tion (SIPP). Sub-section 1.3 overviews both the matching and triple-difference research
designs of Clemens and Wither’s revision. Sub-section 1.4 overviews Zipperer’s cri-
tique. Sub-section 1.5 overviews key issues under contention in the recent literature on
the minimum wage’s employment effects.
Interested readers should look to Clemens (2015) and the September 2016 revision
of Clemens and Wither (2014) for relatively detailed discussions of the analysis samples
and the federal minimum wage change’s legislative history. The discussion below is
limited to the material required to understand the critique raised by Zipperer (2016).
The current paper thus foregoes discussion of a variety of interesting issues (for exam-
ple, nuances of the SIPP and CPS data environments’ strengths and weaknesses). It is
also worth noting that the analyses in Clemens and Wither (2014) and Clemens (2015)
report a fuller range of standard robustness checks than are discussed below. Note that
sub-sections 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 draw liberally on text from the methodology sections of
Clemens and Wither (2014) and Clemens (2015), where the relevant methods were orig-
inally developed. Neither the full text nor the ideas in these sub-sections are original to
the current paper.
1.1 Background on Recent Federal Minimum Wage Increases
The minimum wage changes under analysis resulted from federal legislation passed
on May 25, 2007. Increases went into effect on July 24th of 2007, 2008, and 2009. In July
2007, the federal minimum rose from $5.15 to $5.85, in July 2008 it rose to $6.55, and in
July 2009 it rose to $7.25. The analysis makes use of the fact that these increases were
differentially binding across states.
Figure 1 shows Clemens and Wither’s (2014) division of states into those that were
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fully and partially bound by changes in the federal minimum wage. Figure 2 shows the
time paths of the average effective minimum wage rates across these groups of states.11
On average, the effective minimum across fully bound states rose by $0.60 to $0.70 cents
more than the average effective minimum across partially bound states. The variation
utilized for econometric identification stems from this difference.
1.2 Standard Difference-in-Differences Analysis
In the CPS, the revision of Clemens and Wither (2014) focuses on two samples. The
first consists of individuals ages 16 to 30 with less than a completed high school edu-
cation. The second consists of all young adults ages 16 to 21. The specification used to




+ α1sStates + α2tTimet + Xs,tγ+ εi,s,t. (1)
The specification controls sets of state fixed effects, States, time fixed effects, Timet, and
a vector of controls for variations in states’ macroeconomic conditions, Xs,t. In Clemens
and Wither’s (2014) baseline specification, Xs,t includes a median housing price index
from the Federal Housing Finance Administration (FHFA), which proxies for the state-
level severity of the housing crisis. Within this difference-in-differences framework, the
additional robustness analysis presented in Clemens (2015) considers additional vari-
ables including aggregate state income per capita and stimulus spending per capita
through the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (ARRA).
11Both figure 1 and figure 2 first appeared in Clemens and Wither (2014).
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The CPS analysis sample extends from January 2006 through December 2012. The
coding of time periods allows estimates to track the full transitional dynamics associated
with the law’s implementation. May 2007 through July 2009 is the law’s implementation
period (period p = Transition). Early 2007 and the entirety of 2006 are the base period
(p = 0). Finally, period Post 1(t) corresponds with the first year following the law’s
implementation and period Post 2(t) encompasses subsequent years.
In the 2008 SIPP panel, the analysis in Clemens and Wither (2014) focuses on indi-
viduals whose baseline wage histories reveal them to be most likely to be affected by
the July 2009 increase in the federal minimum wage. The primary analysis sample con-
sists of individuals whose average wage rates between August 2008 and July 2009 were
less than $7.50. In response to both Zipperer and an anonymous referee, Clemens and
Wither (2014) have considered the robustness of their estimates to a range of alternative
sample construction procedures.12




βp(t)Bounds × Periodp(t) + α1sStates
+ α2tTimet + α3iIndividuali + Xs,tγ+ εi,s,t. (2)
This specification differs from equation (1) in two ways. A difference that is visible in
the notation is that the SIPP’s longitudinal nature allows the specification to control for
individual fixed effects, Individuali. There is a second difference that is not visible in
the notation. This reflects the fact that the 2008 SIPP panel begins during the summer
of 2008. Consequently, SIPP samples involve low-wage individuals who had maintained
12These results are available upon request.
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employment into the year between the federal minimum wage’s rise to $6.55 and its
rise to $7.25. The SIPP thus does not allow the analysis to consider the full transitional
dynamics associated with the law’s implementation. The transition period thus has
a different meaning. Motivated by wage dynamics presented in Clemens and Wither
(2014), the specification characterizes May to July 2009 as a period during which reported
wages transitioned quite sharply out of the affected range. All other aspects of the
specification are the same as before.13
For further details on these specifications, I refer readers to Clemens and Wither
(2014) and Clemens (2015). The basic features of these specifications are not the subject
of Zipperer’s critique. Instead, Zipperer’s critique is centered on the addition of control
sets to the specifications as described above.
1.3 Threats to the Estimation of Causal Effects and Additional Lines
of Investigation
There are standard threats to interpreting estimates of βp(t) as causal estimates of
the effect of binding minimum wage increases on low-skilled groups’ employment. The
key question is whether the forces underlying the Great Recession would have generated
larger, similarly sized, or smaller declines in employment among low-skilled individuals
in the bound states relative to the unbound states. Note that this is a setting-specific
statement of the parallel trends assumption that is broadly applicable to difference-in-
differences analyses. The key assumption is that the treatment and control group would
have followed similar paths in the absence of the policy change of interest. This paper
is, in large part, an analysis of the magnitudes of the potential sources of bias and of the
robustness of alternative approaches to accounting for them.
13Clemens (2016) uses the same estimation framework to analyze the relationship between binding
minimum wage changes and changes in participation in a variety of low-income support programs.
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The September 2016 revision of Clemens and Wither (2014) incorporates two further
lines of investigation. The first, which was included in the original working paper, in-
volves a relatively standard triple-difference estimator. The specification appears below:
Yi,s,t = ∑
p(t) 6=0
βp(t)Periodp(t) × Bounds × Targetg(i)
+ α1s,p(t)States × Periodp(t) + α2s,g(i)States × Targetg(i) + α3t,g(i)Timet × Targetg(i)
+ α4sStates + α5tTimet + α6iIndividuali + Xs,t,g(i)γ+ εi,s,t. (3)
Equation (3) augments equation (2) with the standard components of triple-difference
estimation. These include group-by-time-period effects, group-by-state effects, and state-
by-time-period effects.
The idea behind the triple-difference estimator is to use individuals whose observable
skill levels moderately exceed those of minimum wage workers as a within-state control
group. Clemens and Strain (2017) summarize what is and is not accomplished by this
approach. They observe that:
The inclusion of state-by-time-period effects enables the [triple-difference]
specification to control flexibly for economic factors that vary across states
and over time. They control for such factors as they manifest themselves
through employment changes among the individuals included in the sample
as ‘within-state control groups.’
There is a trade-off in determining how high up the skill distribution one
goes to select a within-state control group. Individuals in modestly higher
skill groups, for example, may be both directly and indirectly affected by the
minimum wage change of interest. Direct effects may arise because individ-
uals in modestly higher skill groups may sometimes work in minimum wage
12
jobs. Alternatively, their modestly higher pay rates may be benchmarked to
the minimum wage to preserve a compensation hierarchy within an employ-
ing firm. Indirect effects may arise through bargaining spillovers or through
firms’ substitution of very low-skilled workers for modestly higher skilled
workers. By contrast, high skilled individuals may be poor controls. That
is, the employment of high skilled individuals may be too stable for such in-
dividuals to provide a reasonable counterfactual for the effects of economic
shocks on employment among the low skilled; their labor markets may be
too different for the comparison to be meaningful. The choice of a within-
state control group is thus a dimension of the research design along which
judgment is needed.
An alternative to triple-difference estimation involves estimating sets of difference-
in-differences regressions that, across the samples considered, account for the entirety
of the working age population. One interpretation of such an exercise is that plausible
“within state control groups” are being used in a systematic set of falsification exercises.
Difference-in-differences estimates on samples of high skilled individuals can provide
evidence on the presence of time varying economic conditions that shape employment.
Suppose, for example, that one estimates equation (2) on a sample of high skilled indi-
viduals and that the resulting βPost 2(t) is strongly positive. This result would provide
evidence that general economic conditions were increasing employment among individ-
uals in “bound” states relative to individuals in “unbound” states. Estimates of the same
underlying specification on individuals who are targeted by the minimum wage would
thus likely be biased and should be viewed with skepticism. In the analysis below, I es-
timate such sets of falsification exercises for both the Clemens and Wither baseline and
the specifications in which Zipperer includes his most exhaustive control sets.
An additional piece of analysis in the revision of Clemens and Wither (2014) involves
13
matching states on the basis of their housing declines. Specifically, the analysis matches
states on the size of their median house price declines between 2006 and 2012 (with
values averaged across all months in these years). The matches are thus based on the
extent of the housing decline from the first to the last year of the CPS analysis sample.
The procedure applied is nearest neighbor matching without replacement. Clemens and
Wither’s (2014) revision then restricts samples on the basis of the quality of the resulting
matches.
In the September 2016 revision of Clemens and Wither (2014), the matching exercise
is used as a check on the robustness of Clemens and Wither’s (2014) baseline approach
to controlling for variations in the severity of the housing crisis. In the analysis below,
I similarly use the matching design to investigate the robustness of Zipperer’s analysis.
The analysis provides some clarity on the extent to which Zipperer’s estimates are driven
by the weight his specifications place on comparisons that fall outside of the common
support of the distribution of housing declines.
1.4 An Overview of Zipperer’s Specifications
Zippperer’s critique centers on the sensitivity of estimates of equations (1) and (2) to
the inclusion of several control sets. As summarized in Zipperer’s abstract, he finds that
these estimators are sensitive to the inclusion of “sectoral or geographic controls.” The
control sets Zipperer includes are captured by notation of the equation below:
Yi,s,t = ∑
p(t) 6=0
βp(t)Bounds × Periodp(t) + α1sStates + α2tTimet + Xs,tγ
+ α3r(s),tRegionr(s) × Timet + α4tInd. Share05-06s × Timet + εi,s,t. (4)
The 5 specifications Zipperer estimates involve augmenting equations (1) and (2) with
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permutations of the control sets described by Regionr(s) × Timet and Ind. Share05-06s ×
Timet. In words, these control sets consist of census region-by-time effects or census
division-by-time effects (Regionr(s) × Timet) and interactions between time effects and
variables that describe states’ industry shares at a baseline defined to be an average
across 2005 and 2006 (Ind. Share05-06s × Timet). Zipperer constructs these baseline shares
using data from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages. In some specifications,
Ind. Share05-06s is construction’s share of private sector employment. In others it is a set
of variables describing industry shares at the level of 1-digit NAICS supersectors.14
1.5 Discussion of Points of Contention in the Recent Minimum Wage
Literature
The minimum wage literature’s debate over “sectoral” and “geographic” controls
involves two recurring points of contention. This sub-section overviews these issues.
The first issue, discussed in sub-section 1.5.1, involves the effect of these controls on
the quantity of policy variation they leave in play. In the present setting, assessing this
issue involves assessing the effect of Zipperer’s control sets on the magnitude of the
differential minimum wage change predicted by Bounds× Periodp(t). That is, it involves
assessing the effect of Zipperer’s control sets on the implicit first stage. The second issue,
discussed in sub-section 1.5.2, involves the quality of the variation that remains in play.
That is, this sub-section takes up the question of whether “sectoral” and “geographic”
controls introduce or exacerbate bias despite being intended to reduce it.
14In the CPS context, the latter control set consists of 84 time indicator variables (monthly indicators
across 7 years) each interacted with 9 variables describing the baseline share of private sector of employ-
ment in the NAICS supersectors. There are thus 756 variables in this particular control set. There are
similarly 756 variables in the control set that interacts each of 9 census division indicators with each of 84
time indicators.
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1.5.1 Implications of Sectoral and Geographic Controls for the “First Stage”
The first recurring point of contention involves the question of how dramatically
sectoral and geographic controls reduce the variation available for econometric identifi-
cation. This is a key point of emphasis, for example, in Neumark, Salas, and Wascher
(2014b). These authors colorfully describe Allegretto, Dube, Reich, and Zipperer’s (2017)
approach as “Throwing the Baby out with the Bathwater.”
The analyses of Neumark, Salas, and Wascher (2014b) and Allegretto, Dube, Reich,
and Zipperer (2017) involve a long panel containing more than 200 distinct state and
federal minimum wage changes. In that setting, claims regarding the erosion of identi-
fying variation are difficult to adjudicate. While sectoral and geographic controls clearly
reduce the variation used for identification, there is disagreement over whether the re-
sulting specifications should be viewed as “underpowered.”
In the current setting, attenuation of the policy variation underlying identification
is both straightforwardly relevant and straightforward to assess. Equations (1) and (4)
generate “reduced form” estimates. That is, they generate estimates of the relationship
between employment and indicators for the onset of differentially binding minimum
wage increases. Interpreting this relationship requires information on the underlying
“first stage.” That is, it requires relating any estimated effect on employment to the
underlying change in the minimum wage. This standard scaling of the “reduced form”
by the “first stage” is required to obtain comparable estimates of the change in employ-
ment per dollar increase in the minimum wage. The key point is that estimates from
equations (1) and (4) cannot be informatively compared without information on the im-
plicit first stage point estimates. As shown below, the introduction of Regionr(s) × Timet
and Ind. Share05-06s × Timet significantly reduces the first stage relationship between
Bounds × Periodp(t) and states’ effective minimum wage rates.
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1.5.2 Do Sectoral and Geographic Controls Reduce Bias or Exacerbate It?
A second key question is whether Zipperer’s geographic and sectoral control sets in-
troduce or exacerbate bias despite being intended to reduce it. There are several relevant
issues here. A first set of issues involves the question of whether within-region variation
is less prone to bias than variation that extends both across and within regions. A sec-
ond set of issues involves concerns that arise when controlling for trends in analyses of
policies that have dynamic effects.
While geographic comparisons may have an intuitive appeal, a cursory knowledge
of the geography of the housing crisis reveals within-region variation to be problematic.
In the South, for example, the majority of the individuals in the “control” group come
from Florida. In the Mountain West, the majority come from Arizona. Many readers will
recognize Florida and Arizona to be states that experienced relatively extreme housing
crises, in particular when compared with their regional neighbors. Because the expe-
riences of these states were quite unlike the experiences of their neighbors, the basic
premise underlying within-region comparisons is dubious in this setting.
I save a detailed presentation of descriptive evidence on the pitfalls of within-region
variation for section 3. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 present systematic regression evidence on the
relevance of these pitfalls for Zipperer’s estimates. The remainder of this section focuses
on a separate methodological issue.
In any program evaluation context, it is important to understand when introducing a
new control set risks exacerbating biases despite being intended to correct for potential
biases. It is increasingly appreciated, for example, that controlling for state-specific time
trends can downwardly bias estimates when true causal effects unfold dynamically. Ap-
plications of this point include Wolfers’s (2006) analysis of divorce law and Baum-Snow
and Lutz’s (2011) analysis of school desegregation. In the minimum wage context, this
point was made through simulations that appear in the working paper version of Meer
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and West’s (2013) analysis.
When a policy change’s effects unfold dynamically, state-specific time trends and
correlated covariate sets will also be correlated with the policy change’s causal effect.
Controlling for such covariates will tend to bias estimates towards 0 unless the policy
variables in the regression specification perfectly capture the dynamics of the policy
change’s effects.15 Basic “pre-post” difference-in-differences specifications are thus par-
ticularly exposed to this potential problem. A related issue applies most directly to the
inclusion of control sets like Zipperer’s “baseline industry” controls. The issue involves
a straightforward correlation between the policy effects of interest and the control set.
If states’ minimum wage policies are correlated with their industrial composition, then
interactions between time effects and measures of baseline industrial composition will
be correlated with minimum wage changes’ causal effects. The inclusion of such control
sets will thus tend to bias estimated employment effects towards 0.
2 Evidence on the Effects of the Sectoral and Geographic
Controls on the “First Stage”
Tables 1 through 3 present evidence on the effect of Zipperer’s sectoral and geo-
graphic controls on the first stage relationship between Clemens and Wither’s (2014)
policy indicator variables and states’ minimum wage rates. The tables are organized as
follows. Table 1 presents estimates associated with CPS samples of individuals ages 16
to 30 with less than a completed high school education. Table 2 presents estimates as-
sociated with CPS samples of all young adults ages 16 to 21. Table 3 presents estimates
associated with SIPP samples of individuals who reported average wage rates less than
15This will not generally be possible if the relevant dynamics exhibit heterogeneity within the set of
treatment states due to unobservable factors.
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$7.50 during the period extending from August 2008 through July 2009.
Within each table, column 1 presents estimates from the baseline specification of
Clemens and Wither’s (2014) September 2016 revision. Columns 2 through 6 present
specifications that include the 5 alternative control sets considered by Zipperer. In col-
umn 2, the control set consists of time effects interacted with the construction share
of private sector employment as measured using the average of 2005 and 2006 data in
the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages. Column 3 involves a broader set of
variables describing baseline industry shares. This control set includes full sets of time
effects interacted with variables corresponding with the share of each state’s employ-
ment that comes from each of the 1-digit supersectors in the NAICS industry coding
scheme. In column 4, the control set includes full sets of time effects interacted with sep-
arate indicators for each of the 4 census regions. In column 5, the control set includes full
sets of time effects interacted with separate indicators for each of the 9 census divisions.
Column 6 combines the control sets from columns 2 and 5.
I present first stage results in panel A of each table. For both CPS samples, Zipperer’s
specifications dramatically reduce the first stage point estimate.16 On average across the
CPS samples and specifications, the coefficient βPost 2(t) for the first stage regression is
reduced by nearly 50 percent.
On the SIPP sample, the declines in the first stage point estimates have substantive
implications, but are less dramatic. On average across the 5 SIPP specifications, the
coefficient βPost 2(t) for the first stage regression is reduced by 17 percent. In the SIPP
specifications there is a divide between the effects of the industry share interactions and
the time varying geographic fixed effects. The latter 3 control sets reduce the first stage
16Note that because there are modest discrepancies across existing minimum wage databases, alterna-
tive databases may yield modestly different first stage point estimates. The database used here comes
from the replication materials of Meer and West (2016), but with a correction for the minimum wage rate
applicable in Michigan between October 2006 and October 2007.
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point estimate by an average of 23 percent while the former 2 control sets reduce the
first stage point estimate by an average of 8 percent.
Across the 15 specifications of interest, the average decline in the first stage point
estimate is nearly 40 percent. Comparing Clemens and Wither’s (2014) estimates with
Zipperer’s estimates requires re-scaling the Clemens and Wither baseline for attenuation
of the underlying first stage. On average across all 15 specifications, this re-scaling
accounts for nearly half of the difference between Clemens and Wither’s (2014) estimates
and Zipperer’s estimates.
Because Zipperer does not present these “implicit first stage” estimates, his analysis
provides a misleading impression of the factors underlying differences between his es-
timates and estimates from Clemens and Wither’s (2014) revision. Zipperer attributes
the difference to bias. This section straightforwardly shows that nearly half of the differ-
ence is due to the fact that the estimates as presented are not directly comparable. The
empirical analysis below explores the remainder.
3 A Descriptive Look at the Biases to Which the Baseline
and Within-Region Estimators Are Exposed
3.1 Sources of Bias in the Baseline
Figure 5, which first appeared in Clemens and Wither (2014), presents the evolu-
tion of several macroeconomic indicators in the treatment and control group. Table
4 summarizes the evolution of these and additional economic indicators as they align
with the baseline and post-implementation periods in Clemens and Wither’s (2014) CPS
analysis. The data consistently show that states in the control group were exposed to
recessions of greater severity than were the treatment states. From the baseline through
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the post-implementation period, aggregate income per capita declined by $1,160 more in
the control states than in the treatment states. The overall employment rate declined by
0.5 percentage point more in the control states, employment among prime aged adults
declined by 0.8 percentage point more in the control states, and the unemployment rate
rose by 1.08 percentage points more in the control states. Median house prices declined
by a fairly dramatic $84,000 more in the control states than in the treatment states.
The macroeconomic indicators in figure 5 and table 4 point uniformly to the conclu-
sion that the Great Recession was more severe in the states that comprise Clemens and
Wither’s (2014) control group than in the states that comprise their treatment group. Es-
timates are thus at risk of being biased towards zero. Zipperer asserts the opposite. He
writes that Clemens and Wither’s estimates are biased away from zero because “Bound
and unbound states were not comparable prior to the Great Recession and indeed faced
different employment shocks during the downturn.”
Zipperer presents a cross-sectional fact that he describes as “direct evidence” of the
shocks to which he refers. Specifically, he notes that construction’s share of employment
was higher in 2006 in bound states than in unbound states. Zipperer infers that bound
states were thus exposed to relatively large construction employment shocks.
The data in figure 3 provide evidence that Zipperer’s inference is incorrect. Construc-
tion’s share of employment evolved similarly in bound states relative to unbound states.
The “shock” for which Zipperer claims to provide evidence simply did not materialize.
Construction accounted for a larger share of employment in the bound states than in the
unbound states by roughly the same amount in each year from 2002 through 2015. The
fact that the 2006 construction share was higher in bound states than in unbound states
appears immaterially related to construction’s cycle of boom and bust.17
17The parallel movement in states’ construction shares from 2002 to 2015 suggests that bound states’
“steady state” construction shares are higher than the construction shares in unbound states. The fact that
“bound” states are disproportionately rural may point to reasons why this is the case.
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Figure 4 presents additional evidence that construction shocks were, if anything,
the opposite of what Zipperer infers. The figure presents BEA data on construction
output, which shows that construction declined far more in the control states than in the
treatment states.18 Zipperer’s inference is thus inconsistent with both the construction
output series and the median house price series.
While cross-sectional differences may be indicative of exposure to differential shocks,
they are not direct evidence of such shocks. The data discussed above provide evidence
that the “shocks” Zipperer infers from baseline construction shares lack empirical rele-
vance. That is, they leave no trace in the observed changes in prime aged employment,
income per capita, construction output, or even construction employment itself.
3.2 Sources of Bias When Restricting To Within-Region Variations
The premise underlying Zipperer’s (2016) use of region-by-time fixed effects is that
within-region comparisons are less prone to bias than comparisons that extend both
within and across regions. Knowledge of the housing decline’s geography (in particu-
lar of its within-region variations) casts doubt on this premise as it applies to the cur-
rent setting. Most strikingly, within-region and within-division variation will emphasize
comparisons of Florida to the remainder of the South and of Arizona to the remainder
of the Mountain West. Such comparisons are dubious because these states experienced
housing crises far more extreme than their neighbors. The remainder of this section
presents systematic descriptive evidence on the variations to which within-region esti-
mation shifts attention.
Table 6 presents regional variations in the set of macroeconomic series summarized
18An important detail underlying the BEA’s state-level construction series is that the price adjustment
BEA uses to infer “quantities” is national rather than local. State variations in the series are thus not
driven by variations in home prices. This is easily confirmed in the data. Averages across the bound
and unbound states’ “quantity” and “quantity times price” series diverge from one another by the same
amount and with the same pattern over time.
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previously in table 4. Column 1 presents changes from the baseline period to the post-
implementation period for the control group. Column 2 presents changes for the treat-
ment group. Column 3 presents the difference between column 1 and column 2. Panels
A through D present these differences for the 4 census regions, while panel E presents
averages across census regions. The averages are weighted according to each region’s
share of the population in the CPS analysis of individuals ages 16 to 30 with less than a
completed high school education.
The data in panel E reveal that within-region variations in the severity of the Great
Recession are even less balanced across the treatment and control states than are varia-
tions across the country as a whole. The imbalance in the decline in aggregate income
rises from the $1,160 per capita reported in table 4 to the $1,570 reported in table panel
E of table 6. The imbalance in the decline in aggregate employment rises from 0.5 to 0.8
percentage point, while the imbalance in the decline in prime aged employment rises
from 0.8 percentage point to 1.0 percentage point.
The data in table 6 reveal that restricting attention to within-region variations in-
creases the propensity for estimates to be biased by differences in the severity of the
Great Recession.19 In the meantime, as shown in section 2, it substantially attenuates
the minimum wage variation underlying econometric identification. The following sec-
tion provides regression evidence that, together, these factors explain the entirety of the
difference between Zipperer’s estimates and the Clemens and Wither baseline.
19The data thus support Neumark, Salas, and Wascher’s (2014a) analogy between within-region varia-
tion in minimum wage policy and the use of “twins” or other “within-family” approaches to estimating
the returns to education. If regional neighbors are so similar, it becomes crucial to ask why they adopted
different minimum wage policies. As in the case of twins, within-region comparisons can generate esti-
mates that are either more or less subject to bias than comparisons that extend both across and within
regions. In the present case, states like Arizona, Florida, and New Hampshire may have different mini-
mum wage policies than their neighbors for a variety of reasons. Some of these reasons may make their
populations’ employment trajectories poor counterfactuals for their neighbors’ populations. In both the
present case and the twins case, estimates involving the narrow, superficially attractive comparison can
ultimately be more biased than broader comparisons.
23
4 Regression Evidence on Bias
This section presents regression evidence related to several features of both the base-
line specifications of Clemens and Wither’s (2014) revision and the 5 specifications esti-
mated by Zipperer. The first set of regressions involves the relatively ad hoc exclusion of
Florida and Arizona from the sample. The second set of regressions involves the more
systematic sample selection procedures implemented in Clemens (2015) and the revision
of Clemens and Wither (2014). The third set of regressions involves the systematic set
of regressions in which I estimate the baseline equations of both Clemens and Wither’s
(2014) revision and Zipperer’s (2016) analysis on sub-samples of skill groups that fully
partition the working age population.
4.1 Evidence from the Ad Hoc Exclusion of Florida and Arizona from
the Sample
This section presents estimates in which I exclude Florida and Arizona from the
analysis sample. As shown in section 3, the within-region variation to which Zipperer
restricts attention is less intuitively appealing than one might initially expect. Notably,
it shifts weight towards comparisons of Florida to the remainder of the South and of
Arizona to the remainder of the Mountain West. Excluding these states from the sample
thus provides a very direct, though ad hoc, approach to investigating the hypothesis that
Zipperer’s results are driven by the weight they place on these comparisons. The results
support this view.
Tables 7 through 9 are organized in roughly the same fashion as tables 1 through 3.
Table 7 involves CPS samples of individuals ages 16 to 30 with less than a completed high
school education. Table 8 involves all CPS young adults ages 16 to 21. Table 3 involves
the SIPP sample. Panel A presents the full sample estimates of both the Clemens and
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Wither baseline and the 5 Zipperer specifications. Panel B presents the same sets of
specifications estimated on samples that exclude Florida and Arizona.
The results in tables 7 through 9 reveal that Zipperer’s estimates are significantly
shaped by comparisons involving Florida and Arizona. On average across specifications
in both the SIPP and CPS, the relevant estimates are just over a full percentage point
more negative than the estimates Zipperer presents. Consistent with the bias suggested
by section 3’s descriptive analysis, the specifications that include Zipperer’s region-by-
time and division-by-time effects are more sensitive to Florida and Arizona’s inclusion
than the specifications involving baseline industry controls.20
Between attenuation of first stage point estimates and weight shifted to dubious com-
parisons, the differences between Zipperer’s estimates and Clemens and Wither’s esti-
mates are nearly fully explained. On average across the 15 relevant specifications (5
alternative control sets across 3 analysis samples), the difference between Zipperer’s
βPost 2(t) estimate and the Clemens and Wither baseline is 2.7 percentage points. On av-
erage, re-scaling for the first stage accounts for a 1.3 percentage point difference. The
exclusion of Florida and Arizona shifts Zipperer’s estimates downward by an average of
1.1 percentage points. The re-scaling of the first stage and the role of Florida and Arizona
thus account for nearly 90 percent (2.4 out of 2.7 percentage points) of the difference be-
tween Zipperer’s estimates and the baseline estimates from Clemens and Wither’s (2014)
revision.
While the difference between Zipperer’s estimates and Clemens and Wither’s es-
timates has plausibly been explained, the exclusion of Florida and Arizona from the
sample may seem excessively ad hoc. In the following sub-sections, I thus pursue a
20Consistent with section 1.5.2’s discussion of sources of bias, the industry-controls specifications yield
particularly strong and implausible correlations between minimum wage increases and increases in em-
ployment among high-experience, high-education, and high-wage individuals. This analysis appears in
tables 11 and 12 and is discussed in section 4.3.
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more systematic analysis of potential bias.
4.2 Evidence from Matches Based on the Severity of States’ Housing
Declines
Tables 10 through 12 present estimates on samples that apply the matching criteria
developed for Clemens (2015) and the revision of Clemens and Wither (2014). These
criteria were thus developed prior to Zipperer’s comment. Zipperer’s comment omits
discussion of this aspect of Clemens and Wither’s (2014) analysis. This is unfortunate, as
it sheds light on the relevance of extreme housing crisis experiences for both Zipperer’s
specifications and Clemens and Wither’s baseline estimates.
Tables 10 through 12 present three sets of estimates. Panel A again presents the full
sample estimates of Clemens and Wither’s baseline alongside Zipperer’s 5 specifications.
In panel B, the sample is limited to states that could be matched to a state with a median
house price decline no more than $10,000 different than its own decline. In panel C, the
sample is limited to states that could be matched to a state with a median house price
decline no more than $20,000 different than its own decline.21
The estimates are quite similar to the estimates reported in tables 7 through 9. On
average across the 30 relevant specifications (5 specifications across 3 analysis samples
and 2 matching criteria), the estimates of Zipperer’s specifications are 1.55 percentage
points more negative than the estimates Zipperer reports. Coupled with the appropriate
re-scaling for his specifications’ attenuation of the first stage, the difference between
Zipperer’s estimates and those in the revision of Clemens and Wither (2014) is fully
21Sorted by state postal codes, the states dropped when using the $20,000 criterion are: AL, AZ, CA,
DE, FL, LA, MA, MI, MT, ND, NM, NV, RI, WA, IN, KY, NE, SC, and UT. The states dropped by the $10,000
criterion are: AL, AR, AZ, CA, CT, DE, FL, GA, HI, KS, LA, MA, ME, MI, MO, MS, MT, ND, NM, NV,
OK, RI, SD, TN, VA, WA, and WI. Restricting samples towards the common support of the distribution of
house price declines involves dropping unbound states with unusually large housing declines and bound
states with relatively smooth housing market experiences.
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explained.
The exclusion of states with housing crises outside the common support connecting
the treatment and control groups substantially affects Zipperer’s estimates. More specif-
ically, it makes them systematically more negative. In contrast, the matching design has
modest effects on the estimates from Clemens and Wither’s (2014) revision.
4.3 Evidence from Higher Skill Groups
Tables 13 and 14 present estimates of equations (1) and (4) on sub-samples of skill
groups that systematically partition the working age population. The estimates in these
tables are organized differently than the estimates in earlier tables. Table 13 presents
estimates from the CPS. Columns 1 through 3 present estimates across samples that fully
partition the working age population on the basis of both age and education. Columns
4 through 6 similarly present estimates across samples that partition the working age
population on the basis of age alone. Table 14 presents estimates from the SIPP. The
working age population is again fully partitioned, in this case on the basis of baseline
wage histories.
The estimates in panel A are of the baseline specifications from Clemens and Wither’s
(2014) revision. Each of the estimates in panel A of both table 13 and 14 appear in the
September 2016 revision of Clemens and Wither (2014). The estimates demonstrate that
the differential employment declines in states that were fully bound by this period’s
minimum wage changes occurred exclusively among skill groups that are plausibly af-
fected by the minimum wage. In the CPS, this includes young adults ages 16 to 21 and
individuals ages 16 to 30 with less than a completed high school education. In the SIPP,
this includes individuals with average baseline wage rates below $7.50 as well as indi-
viduals who were not employed throughout the baseline period. Estimates for all other
skill groups are statistically indistinguishable from 0 and generally economically quite
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close to 0.
Panels B and C investigate whether Zipperer’s specifications pass this same system-
atic set of checks. Panel B presents the specification in which Zipperer includes his most
detailed set of industry share-by-time controls. Panel C presents the specification in
which Zipperer includes the relatively extensive set of census division by time effects.
In Zipperer’s specifications, minimum wage increases predict substantial increases
in employment among skill groups for which the minimum wage has no direct effect. In
the SIPP analysis, Zipperer’s specifications suggest that a $0.40 increase in the minimum
wage (see the first stage estimates from table 3) generated an 0.8 percentage point in-
crease in employment among individuals with average baseline wages in excess of $10.
The estimates implausibly suggest that economy-wide employment would have gone up
during the Great Recession had the minimum wage risen by an additional $3.
In the CPS regressions, estimates of Zipperer’s specifications involving higher skill
groups (columns 2,3, 5, and 6) are uniformly positive, though mixed with regards to
statistical significance. In the industry-shares specification, results for high skill groups
are uniformly quite strongly statistically significant. On average across the two sets of
specifications, the results suggest that a $0.30 minimum wage increase (see the first stage
estimates from tables 1 and 2) led to a 1 percentage point increase in employment among
adults with significant experience and/or at least a high school degree.22 In the CPS,
Zipperer’s estimates thus suggest that employment would have increased during the
Great Recession had the minimum wage risen by just $2 more.
It has become fashionable to speculate that minimum wage increases might increase
22Recall that the “target” samples of young adults and young, low-education individuals account for an
average of roughly 10 percent of the working age population. A percentage point of employment among
the remaining 90 percent of the working age population thus corresponds with the same number of jobs
as a nearly 10 percentage point change in employment among the smaller low-skilled groups. Recalling
further that Zipperer’s specifications suggest little to no employment loss among the low-skilled groups,
employment increases among the higher skilled cannot plausibly be interpreted as a substitution effect.
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employment through “stimulus” effects. It is thus necessary to be clear that such effects
cannot plausibly explain the results described above. In Zipperer’s CPS specifications,
the estimates imply that a $1 increase in low-skilled workers’ wage bills predicts an
increase of roughly $50 in higher skilled individuals’ wage bills.23 This is well over an
order of magnitude beyond what the “minimum wage stimulus” argument can plausibly
imply.
5 Recapitulation of Basic Facts and Findings
In this section, I return to the basic facts underlying Clemens and Wither’s (2014) as-
sessment of the evidence in their September 2016 revision. The basic facts are as follows.
Across low-skilled groups in states with similarly sized housing declines, employment
declined far more when the state was fully bound by this period’s minimum wage in-
creases than when the state was only partially bound. Among individuals ages 16 to 30
with less than a completed high school education, the differential decline was 3 and a
half percentage points. Among young adults ages 16 to 21, the differential was 2 and a
half percentage points. Among the more targeted sample of low-skilled workers in the
SIPP, the differential was 6 and a half percentage points.
Tables 4 and 5 enable readers to generate their preferred estimate by working directly
from unadjusted data. Employment among low-skilled groups declined modestly more
in fully bound states than in partially bound states in spite of the fact that the recessions
23Recall that the first stage in Zipperer’s specification predicts a $0.30 differential increase in states’
minimum wage rates. The affected population works an average of around 1000 hours per year, so that
the differential increase in annual income would be $300. This applies to several percent of the working
age population, suggesting that the earnings gains amount to roughly $10 per working age individual. By
way of comparison, the employment gains predicted by Zipperer’s specification suggest an employment
increase of roughly 1 percentage point across skill groups that account for 90 percent of the working age
population. Average earnings within this group are on the order of $50,000 per year. A 1 percentage point
increase in the prevalence of such earnings thus amounts to $500 per working age individual. There is
thus roughly $500 in additional earnings among the “middle” and “high” skilled per $10 in mechanical
earnings gain among minimum wage workers. The implied “earnings multiplier” is thus roughly 50.
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in fully bound states were less severe than the recessions in partially bound states. In
the unadjusted CPS data, the differential employment decline from the baseline through
the post-implementation period was just over half of a percentage point among young
adults and just over 1 percentage point among individuals ages 16 to 30 with less than
a completed high school education (see panel B of table 4).24 In the more targeted SIPP
sample, the unadjusted differential decline was nearly 4 percentage points (see panel B
of table 5).
Readers can use the macroeconomic and housing market indicators from panel A of
tables 4 and 5 to adjust for variations in the severity of the Great Recession as they see
fit. One way to arrive at the baseline estimates of Clemens and Wither is to assume that
employment among low-skilled groups was between 2 and 3 times as sensitive to the
forces underlying the Great Recession as was employment among prime aged adults.
Our baseline estimates are also what one obtains by applying external evidence from
Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo (2016).
Three facts underlie my application of Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo’s (2016) es-
timates. First, on a population weighted basis, the average housing decline in partially
bound states was roughly 1.15 standard deviations larger than the average housing de-
cline in fully bound states. Second, for a broad group containing all individuals ages 21
to 55, Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo (2016) estimate that a 1 standard deviation dif-
ference in the housing bubble’s magnitude predicts a differential employment change of
0.9 percentage point. Third, the groups analyzed by Clemens and Wither (2014) exhibit
roughly twice the sensitivity to the housing decline as this broad group of primarily
prime-aged individuals.25 The implied bias is thus on the order of 2 to 2.5 percentage
24Note that these are the results one obtains if one runs the simplest possible difference-in-differences
specification in which there are no macroeconomic covariates, the set of state dummy variables is replaced
with a “Treatment” indicator, the set of time dummy variables is replaced with a “Post” indicator, and the
sample excludes the transition period between the law’s legislation and full implementation.
25This assessment is based on differences in the coefficients on the house price index in estimates
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points depending on the group under analysis.26 These adjustments correspond almost
exactly to the difference between the unadjusted CPS data and Clemens and Wither’s
baseline regression estimates.
The remainder of Clemens and Wither’s analysis explores potential threats to the
magnitude of these estimates and to the case for causal identification. In both the SIPP
and CPS, the estimates are robust to the inclusion of a range of macroeconomic covariates
as controls. The estimates are further robust to restricting the sample to states that can
be matched on the basis of their housing declines. Finally, the differential employment
declines occur entirely among skill groups that are directly affected by the minimum
wage. These features of Clemens and Wither’s analysis underlie their assessment that
the baseline estimate is the most plausible reading of the evidence.
As shown above, the specifications Zipperer puts forth lack several of the proper-
ties underlying this assessment. Consistent with descriptive evidence on the pitfalls of
within-region variation, Zipperer’s estimates are quite sensitive to the exclusion of states
with housing declines outside the common support connecting the treatment and con-
trol groups. Excluding these states from the sample makes his estimates systematically
more negative, by an average of roughly 1.5 percentage points. Second, Zipperer’s spec-
ifications have the implausible implication that employment among high-skilled groups
would have expanded during the Great Recession had the minimum wage, which does
not affect these groups directly, been increased by an additional $2 or $3. Finally, Zip-
perer’s specifications significantly dilute the treatment (that is, they attenuate the implicit
first stage) underlying estimated employment changes. Their reduction in the implicit
first stage, which his analysis does not report, accounts for roughly half of the difference
involving samples restricted to the relevant skill groups.
26For the sample of 21 to 55 year olds, the adjustment would have been 1.15× 0.9 ≈ 1. Because the
skill groups Clemens and Wither (2014) analyze have employment that is twice or just more than twice as
sensitive to house price declines, the adjustment for these groups is between 2 and 2.5 percentage points.
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between his estimates and the Clemens and Wither baseline.
6 Conclusion
Clemens and Wither (2014) use a straightforward conceptual framework to place their
empirical analysis in context. As similarly discussed by Clemens and Strain (2017), the
framework draws on Bound and Johnson’s (1992) descriptive division of wage determi-
nants into competitive and institutional forces. This dichotomy is ideal for conveying the
economic implications of the minimum wage, which hinge on whether low-skilled indi-
viduals’ wages are low due primarily to competitive market forces or to shortcomings in
their bargaining power. Unintended job loss will tend to be large when low wages reflect
low competitive market valuations of low-skilled workers’ output. Conversely, intended
wage gains can be large when weak bargaining positions generate large wedges between
individuals’ wages and their competitively valued marginal products.
The dichotomy between market and institutional forces delivers a further, closely
related insight. The minimum wage’s effectiveness as a response to changes in inequal-
ity can depend crucially on the causes of slow wage growth at the wage distribution’s
lower tail. If slow wage growth reflects a weakening of bargaining positions, then the
wedge between wages and marginal products would be expanding. The capacity for the
minimum wage to generate wage gains without reducing employment would thus be
increasing. By contrast, if slow wage growth reflects the competitive effects of trade and
technology driven developments (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Autor, Katz, and Kearney,
2008; Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2013), the job loss linked to a given real value of the
minimum wage may, if anything, be rising.27
27The arrival of lower cost production possibilities reduces prices in competitive product markets. In
both the framework of Clemens and Wither’s (2014) revision and in standard instructional diagrams,
this reduces the value of low-skilled workers’ output, or their “marginal revenue product.” Note that
downward shifts in the marginal revenue product curve reduce the efficient wage in both the monopsony
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This line of reasoning connects to two empirical insights regarding the minimum
wage’s effects on employment. A first point is that the minimum wage is an institution
that mediates how the labor market responds to economic shocks. More specifically, it
is a source of rigidity that, in both neoclassical and new Keynesian models, will increase
the employment loss linked to declines in demand for goods and, by extension, for
labor. This point is easily overlooked in standard program evaluation analyses because it
involves the mediation of shocks to labor demand rather than the effects of changes to the
minimum wage itself. Such effects will not be readily detected using standard program
evaluation techniques. This highlights that standard program evaluation techniques can
be insufficient to generate evidence on key dimensions of the minimum wage’s effects.
The second insight is that the potential magnitude and duration of a minimum wage
change’s bite can be gauged using a combination of wage and productivity data. As
shown in Clemens and Wither’s (2014) revision, baseline wage data provide insight into
the depth of a minimum wage increase’s bite into low-skilled groups’ wage distribu-
tions. Subsequent inflation and productivity data provide further insight into that bite’s
duration. This final insight leads to the analysis underlying figure 6, which appears in
Clemens and Wither’s (2014) revision.
Figure 6 presents data on low-skilled groups’ wage distributions for the periods sur-
rounding the federal minimum wage increases of both the 1990s and the 2000s. The key
point is that these historical episodes differ dramatically. During the 1990s, the federal
minimum wage rose by 21 percent, inflation was moderate, and productivity growth was
rapid. During the late 2000s, the federal minimum wage rose by 41 percent, inflation was
modest, and productivity growth was quite slow.28 Both the depth and duration of the
diagram and the diagram associated with competitive firms. At any wage rate above the efficient wage,
this shift would similarly increase the job loss associated with any given value of the minimum wage.
28This is particularly true when headline productivity statistics are adjusted for changes in the labor
market’s composition (Bosler, Daly, Fernald, and Hobijn, 2016). Such composition effects were partic-
ularly prominent during this historical episode because employment declined dramatically among low-
33
latter minimum wage increase’s bite was thus far greater than that of the earlier increase.
It would be truly surprising, whether the low-skilled labor market is perfectly or imper-
fectly competitive, if these minimum wage changes’ employment effects did not differ
accordingly.
Early data on the effects of minimum wage changes enacted since 2012 appear con-
sistent with the general point that macroeconomic and broader labor market conditions
matter. Through 2016, employment among young adults in states that have increased
their minimum wage rates has kept up with, if not modestly outpaced, employment in
states that have not. Disentangling the effects of this more recent period’s minimum
wage changes from variations in the robustness of the economic expansion will be an
important task for future work. Future data may also shed light on the dynamics with
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Figure 1: States Bound by the 2008 and 2009 Federal Minimum Wage Increases:
The map differentiates states on the basis of whether they were fully or partially bound by the July 2007,
2008 and 2009 increases in the federal minimum wage. I define states as fully bound if their January 2008
minimum wage, as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), was less than $6.55. Such states were
at least partially bound by the July 2008 increase in the federal minimum and fully bound by the July 2009





















Jan,05 Jan,07 Jan,09 Jan,11 Jan,13
States Bound by Federal Minimum Wage Increases
States Not Bound by Federal Minimum Wage Increases
Average Effective Minimum Wages
Figure 2: Evolution of the Average Minimum Wage in Bound and Unbound States:
As in the previous figure, states are defined as fully bound if they were reported by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) to have had a minimum wage less than $6.55 in January 2008. Such states were at least
partially bound by the July 2008 increase in the federal minimum and fully bound by the July 2009 increase
from $6.55 to $7.25. Effective monthly minimum wage data were taken from the detailed replication
materials associated with Meer and West (Forthcoming). Within each group of states, the average effective
minimum wage is weighted by state population. The dashed vertical line indicates the May 2007 passage
of the federal minimum wage increases, while the solid vertical line indicates the timing of the July 2009
implementation of the final increase from $6.55 to $7.25.
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Year
Construction Pop. Share: Bound
Construction Pop. Share: Unbound
Construction Employment As Share of Population
Figure 3: Evolution of Construction Employment:
Note: The figure present the evolution of construction employment as estimated using data from the basic
CPS. The series in panel A reports construction employment as a fraction of total employment. The series
in panel B reports construction employment as a fraction of the working age population.
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Q1 2006 Q1 2008 Q1 2010 Q1 2012 Q1 2014
Year
Construction Quantity Index: Bound
Construction Quantity Index: Unbound
Construction Quantity Index (BEA): Normalized to Q1 2006
Figure 4: Evolution of Construction Employment:
Note: The figure present the evolution of construction output as reported by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA). The series in panel A are population weighted averages of the BEA’s regional accounts
construction quantity index. The series in panel B renormalizes the indices to take a value of 100 in the













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6: Within Region Comparisons of the Recession’s Severity
(1) (2) (3)
Change from Baseline to Post
Bound Unbound Diff.
Panel A: Midwest
Income Per Cap. (1000s) -1.01 0.52 1.53
Employment Rate -0.05 -0.04 0.01
Unemployment Rate 4.043 2.934 -1.109
Med. House Price (Millions) -0.043 -0.020 0.023
Const. Output Index (BEA) -19.38 -6 16.31
Prime Aged Emp. Rate -0.048 -0.033 0.015
Panel B: Northeast
Income Per Cap. (1000s) -0.13 -0.06 0.07
Employment Rate -0.034 -0.027 0.007
Unemployment Rate 3.886 2.194 -1.692
Med. House Price (Millions) -0.063 -0.078 -0.015
Const. Output Index (BEA) -5.8 -23.23 -24.09
Prime Aged Emp. Rate -0.035 -0.03 0.005
Panel C: South
Income Per Cap. (1000s) -4.03 -0.58 3.45
Employment Rate -0.06 -0.041 0.019
Unemployment Rate 6.045 3.775 -2.27
Med. House Price (Millions) -0.161 -0.016 0.145
Const. Output Index (BEA) -44.83 -11.8 54.1
Prime Aged Emp. Rate -0.066 -0.039 0.027
Panel D: West
Income Per Cap. (1000s) -2.98 -3.25 -0.27
Employment Rate -0.056 -0.065 -0.009
Unemployment Rate 5.691 5.096 -0.595
Med. House Price (Millions) -0.174 -0.071 0.103
Const. Output Index (BEA) -39.32 -33.4 13.62
Prime Aged Emp. Rate -0.052 -0.068 -0.016
Panel E: Averages across Regions
Income Per Cap. (1000s) 1.572
Employment Rate 0.008
Unemployment Rate -1.517
Med. House Price (Millions) 0.083
Const. Output Index (BEA) 23.379
Prime Aged Emp. Rate 0.010
Note: This table presents summary statistics on changes in the income per capita, aggregate employment
rates, aggregate unemployment rates, median house prices, construction output, and prime aged employ-
ment across regions. The weights applied to obtain weighted averages across regions correspond with
each region’s share of the CPS least-skilled sample. Data come from BEA, BLS, and FHFA.
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